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EXPERT TESTIMONY THAT DRUG ADDICTS ARE UN-
WORTHY OF BELIEF INADMISSIBLE
People v. Williams
6 N.Y.2d 18, 159 N.E.2d 549 (1959)
Defendant's conviction for selling heroin was based primarily upon the
testimony of the State's principal witness, the buyer. This witness had been
addicted to the use of heroin to the extent that for five years prior to the
arrest he had daily introduced the drug hypodermically into his body. He
had not used any drugs on the day in question nor at any time thereafter up
to and including the day he testified, four months later.' A physician was
called to give testimony on the effects of addiction upon the witness. The
trial court determined that the offer of proof was for the purpose of estab-
lishing that a narcotic addict could not tell the truth. The expert testimony
was held inadmissible -by the trial judge. The New York Court of Appeals,
two judges dissenting, affirmed, holding that in the absence of a clear and
convincing showing to the full satisfaction of the court that such testimony
was the consensus of medical and scientific opinion, the evidence is
inadmissible.2
The authorities are in conflict concerning the admissibility of testimony
showing addiction, or use of narcotics by a witness, for the purpose of
attacking his credibility. The majority hold testimony admissible which
tends to prove:
(a) that he was under the influence of the drug while testifying, or
(b) that he was under the influence of the drug when the events to
which he testified occurred, or
(c) that his mental faculties were actually impaired by the habit 3
The minority hold the broad view that evidence of the use of narcotics
is admissible generally for impeachment purposes. 4
Once the fact of being under the influence or the addiction is shown,
the problem is the permissible scope of expert testimony regarding the
characteristics of an addict or the effect the use has on his credibility as a
witness.
But it would seem clear that this evidence would be immaterial
unless it was proposed to follow it up by showing the effect of such
drug upon the capacity of perception, for otherwise, how is the
1 He was permitted, however, to receive two injections of "dope" at a hospital
after his arrest on the day of the sale.
2 The dissenting judges felt the record sufficiently showed that the purpose was
not merely to show whether or not such a person as the witness could be sincere, but
was for the purpose of showing the general characteristics of a person addicted to drugs.
3 Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 848 (1957). Admissibility of testimony under these circum-
stances is treated on the general principles connected with intoxication; the addiction
goes to affecting the perception, memory, or ability to narrate of the witness.
4 Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 848 (1957). Under this view the effect, if any, of addiction
upon the veracity of the witness is admissible.
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jury to know the effect of the drug? It would hardly seem that
courts are already willing to go so far as to hold that the effect of
narcotic addiction upon the testimonial capacity of its user is so
well known that jurors may take notice of it without the necessity
of proof.5
Testimony as to the effect addiction has upon the witne .-erception,
memory, and narration is generally held to be admissible.6 The divergence
of opinion arises when the proponent desires to include evidence of the effect
the addiction has upon the witness's "sincerity," "veracity," "truthfulness,"
or "worthiness of belief," as was attempted in the instant case.7 Had the
proponent dearly indicated to the court that his purpose was to show the
characteristics of a narcotic user as to perception or memory, and steered
clear of any reference to sincerity, veracity, truthfulness, or worthiness of
belief, a different result would have been likely.
The basis which courts often assert for refusing to allow testimony con-
cerning the sincerity of a narcotic user is that to do so would entangle the
court in the trial of a "collateral matter."8 This alone would appear insuffi-
cient reason for exclusion since "collateral" questions are often appropriate
when their answers will aid the jury in reaching a determination. It is more
likely that the true basis for exclusion is the fear of undue influence on the
jury. The courts fear that a scientific opinion that goes to the ascertainment
of the truth or falsity of a witness's testimony may be given undue weight
and that the jury is likely to replace what should ultimately be their deter-
mination2 with that of the expert. Had there been a showing that the testi-
mony in the instant case, was the consensus of scientific opinion, the court
would have apparently felt such influence warranted. This lack of faith in
the jury should be questioned when it is considered that courts rely exclu-
sively upon the jury to determine many difficult problems, such as the
"prudent man" principle in tort liability.
5 Rossman, "The Testimony of Drug Addicts," 3 Ore. L. Rev. 81, 102 (1924).
* "[T]he question should have been followed up by a statement or assurance that
defendant expected to show that the habit was so excessive as to impair the memory of
the plaintiff." Standard Oil Co. v. Carter, 210 Ala. 572, 575, 98 So. 575, 577 (1924).
7 "But by the form of the question the witness was asked to express his opinion
as to the effect of such use upon the veracity of the witness, and, so limited, the exclusion
of the answer was proper." State v. Robinson, 12 Wash. 491, 497, 41 Pac. 884, 886
(1895) ; "One of the major contentions of appellant is that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in limiting Dr. Shaw's testimony, in effect, to his opinion as to what
effect addiction would have on memory and perception and ability to narrate, but
preventing testimony as to the effect of addiction on veracity." The court held these
restrictions were proper. People v. Bell, 138 Cal. App.2d 7, 10, 291 P.2d 150, 151 (1956).
8 "Whether the witness was a confirmed opium eater or not, or whether the
indulgence renders the user unreliable and untruthful in his statements, was a col-
lateral issue, which the court properly declined to try." State v. King, 88 Minn. 175,
181, 92 N.W. 965, 968 (1903); Katleman v. State, 104 Neb. 62, 175 N.W. 671 (1920)
(relying on State v. King). It is to be noted that in both cases the attack upon the
witness went to his reliability and truthfulness.
9 See, e.g., 4 Jones, Evidence § 990 (5th ed. 1958) ; 58 Am. Jur. "Witnesses" § 862
(1948); 42 Ohio Jur. "Witnesses" § 430 (1936).
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The few courts' ° admitting expert testimony for this purpose cite
medical treatises which state that addiction renders a person unworthy of
belief, or they merely make the broad statement that the fact is well
known."- However, one questions if it can be said to be an established fact
in light of many contrary opinions of experts in the field.'2 Several other
cases 13 that are sometimes cited in support of admissibility do not lend much
support since their reports do not make it clear that the purpose of the
proffered testimony was to establish lack of sincerity.
In summary then, a witness who is a drug addict may be impeached in
the usual manner if his addiction has led him to be held in ill repute in the
community. He may be impeached if he was under the influence of the drug
at the time of testifying or at the time the event to which he is testifying
occurred; or if his addiction was to the extent that there is shown to be an
actual impairment of his faculties. This is accomplished by showing the
effect the addiction has upon the perception, memory or narration of the
witness. But the courts generally, and the court here, will not extend im-
peachment of his credibility (in the absence of scientific acceptance) to
include the effect the addiction has on his sincerity and thereby label him
as unworthy of belief.
John K. Skomp
1o Vamvas v. United States, 13 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1926); State v. Fong Loon, 29
Idaho 248, 158 Pac. 233 (1916); Effinger v. Effinger, 48 Nev. 205, 228 Pac. 615, on
rehearing 239 Pac. 801 (1925); Lankford v. Tombari, 35 Wash.2d 412, 213 P.2d 627
(1950).
11 "We believe it will be admitted that habitual users of opium, or other like
narcotics, become notorious liars." [Then quotes to this effect from 3 Wharton & Still6,
Medical jurisprudence § 1111 (3d ed. 1873)], State v. Fong Loon, supra. note 10; "The
mental confusion and impairment of moral character produced by the habitual use of
morphine, cocaine, or a like narcotic are established facts in medical research." Effinger
v. Effinger, supra note 10; "The habitual use of opium ... is known to utterly deprave
the victim of its use, and render him unworthy of belief." State v. Concannon, 25 Wash.
327, 335, 65 Pac. 534, 537 (1901) ; for medical support that drug addicts are pathological
liars see comprehensive list in Rossman, supra note 5.
12 Kolb, "Drug Addiction in Its Relation to Crime," 9 Mental Hygiene 74; Kolb,
"Pleasure and Deterioration from Narcotic Addiction," 9 Mental Hygiene 699; Bishop,
The Narcotic Drug Problem 22 (1920); Hawkins, Opium Addicts and Addiction 40
(1937); for a discussion of numerous treatises on the subject, see Kelly v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 45 F.2d 782 (W.D. Va. 1929), aff'd, 45 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1930).
13 Chicago & N.W.R.R. v. McKenna, 74 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1934) (effect which
continued addiction might have upon one's mental faculties); People v. Hamby, 6 Ill.
2d 559, 129 N.E.2d 746 (1955) (fact of narcotics addiction has an important bearing
upon credibility); People v. Crump, 5 IU.2d 251, 125 N.E.2d 615 (1955) (jury entitled
to know whether witness had been a drug adict or had used narcotics on the day of the
alleged crime); State v. Prentice, 192 Iowa 207, 183 N.W. 411 (1921) (can show effect
of such use on mind and memory); Markowitz v. Markowitz, 290 S.W. 119 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1927) (the testimony was to the general effect upon the mental and moral con-
dition of the addict) ; Beland v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 285, 217 S.W. 147 (1920) (fact
of habitual use should be admitted as a circumstance to be considered by the jury in
determining witness's memory and mental condition).
